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AN ANALYSIS OF PLANNED LIGHT INDUSTRY
ZONING
A THEME of resistance to industrial neighbors by residential prop-
erty owners has characterized the brief history of zoning in the
United States,' despite the fact that a number of suburban municipalities
have recognized the advisability of encouraging some types of industry
to locate there as a means of promoting the economic, social, and even
cultural welfare of the community.2
Before the advent of the industrial revolution in England, segrega-
tion of residence and industry was neither possible nor desirable, since
craftsmen were engaged almost exclusively in "home-industry" trades.
Yet, if a nuisance were created by their operation, equity could enjoin
the offensive activity, thereby establishing the first industrial land-use
control." Once the factory made its appearance, however, urban living
changed. Industrial operations became noisy, dirty, and unsightly;
houses of the factory workers were often crowded near the plant, and
even the homes of the rich were affected by the "pall of progress.".
As applied to such conditions, the law of nuisance was inadequate,4
although, for many years, no attempt was made to alleviate the situa-
tion created by the proximity of industry to private residential areas.
The United States experienced a similar undesirable development,
although the problem was not so acute as in England, for a greater
land area permitted adequate segregation of residential communities
from the factories. That this result did not always obtain, however,
is apparent from the severe overcrowding created in such areas as New
2 1 YOKLEY, ZONING §§ 5-8 (1953) contain a history of the law of zoning in the
United States.
-'See, e.g., Seiber v. Laawe, 33 N.J. Super. 115, 1o9 A.ad 470 (954): Newark
Milk Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills," Law Division, Docket No. L-738x-55
P.W., Sup. Ct. Morris Co., N.J., May zz, 1957. In an article in New Jersey
Municipalities, Feb. 1957, p. 6, Mr. Henry Fagin, Director of Planning, Regional Plan
Association, Inc., stated that ". . . a good many towns, however, are finding that they
do need some industrial ratables after all. Of course, they only want the plant that
looks like Princeton University in mid-August."
' For a comprehensive discussion of the application of the law of nuisance to land
use control see GREEN, ZONING IN NoRT CAROLINA 6-z (1952).
'Id. at x5. Mr. Green suggests that this is so because the law of ntisance has
dealt with the worst sore spots in the community and it has been applied in a "sporadic,
unplanned manner."
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York: City,' where light and air were virtually excluded in the canyons
of lower Manhattan, and factories, stores, and garages invaded formerly
"high-class" residential areas.6
Consequently, New York, in 19 16, through a, building-zone resolu-
tionT" which-- provided various land-use controls for certain- -restricted
areas, was the first.city in the United States squarely to attack the prob-
lem of industrial miscreancy:. The validity of the- resolution was upheld
in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp.,", where, in a suit for
specific performance of a &ntict for the sale of land, the Court of
Appeals'of New York held thatthe resolution was- valid and did not
create an- encumbrance upon the larid. - The opinion "einph;sized that
as the conduct of an individual may be regulated by the state, so, too,
it is a proper exercise of the' police power of the state to regulate an
individual's use of his property.
- Although the Lincoln Trust decision'wa a major advance in estab-
lishing the validity of zoning, the landmark case in the United States
was Village of Evclid-v. Ambler Realty Co.19 wherein the'Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the validity of a comprehensive
municipal zoning ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power of
the community and declared that it was not unreasonable nor discrim-
inatory as applied to the plaintiff's land.10  As a result of hf'e dedsi6ns
culminating in the Euclid. case, the general validity- of comprehensive
zoning was thus established.
Traditionally, however, industry has been regarded as the stepchild
of zoning. When provision for industry is made in a zoning ordingnce,
it is usually relegated to the least desirable area of the municipality, a
result dictated by the historic tendency to consider industry an un-
"See BASS-Tr, ZONING ±0-25 (1936).
6MMzENBAUM, ZONING 4- (930).-
TThe Resolution divided the city into three types of use districts, residence, business
and unrestricted. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corporation, 229 N.Y. 313,
128 N.E. 2o9 (1970).
a Hi.
'±72 U.S. 365 -(x926).-
" In the Euclid ordinance, the city was divided 'into six use districts, three height
districts and four area districts. Proponents of industrial expansion in the village op-
posed the ordinance on the ground that the majority of land area in the village could
best be used for industrial purposes- as- two railroads ran through the town which was
a suburb of Cleveland, thus providing ready transportation of industrial output to a
major market area and distribution point. Mr. James Metzenbauni; attorney for the
Village, describes the stmitfgy "xriployed in the: Supreme Court of the United States in
MEZEMMUM, ZONING ioS-12 (9 o). . - "-
i§581
90 DUKE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 7: 98
desirable neighbor. Some types of industrial development have, never-
theless, progressed beyond the offensive, noisy, factory stage,' 1 and,
when located on spacious landscaped grounds and housed in small
dusters of attractive buildings, may be considered compatible with resi-
dential areas. Many examples of such "campus industry" presently
exist, 2 and it is this type of industry which best lends itself to the needs
of suburban communities in promotioi of general municipal prosperity.
SPECIAL-INDuSTRY AMENDMENS
Should a residential community deem it advisable to admit campus
industry to an area zoned for residential use only, an amendment to the
existant zoning ordinance is essential. An examination of the zoning
enabling acts of seven representative states reveals five basic steps in
adopting such an amendment: initiation, public hearing, procedure upon
protest by landowners, passage by the town council, and publication.'
Usually an enabling act directs the town council to initiate all zoning
ordinance amendments;' 4 however, in Illinois and California, a plan-
ning commission is designated as the initiating body," thus permitting
1 An example of this type industry is the manufacture of precision electronic equip-
ment which is usually manufactured in quiet inoffensive surroundings. Consequently,
some ordinances limit the industrial uses to the manufacture of small articles. Thus,
publishing, research and testing of pharmaceutical products, manufacturing of precision
electrical, electronic and optical equipment, engraving and light woodwork manu-
facturing only are permitted by one ordinance. BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF TOWN
o, YORKTOWN, N.Y. § 5A 3 (x941) (amended 1957) on file in the Duke Law Library.
However, the industrial use permitted should not be determined by the size of the
article but by the effect the manufacturing processes have upon the surrounding area.
Fagin, supra note a, says "the processing of a tiny electronic part may be more of a
nuisance in the neighborhood than the outfitting of a big yacht if the routine testing
of that part causes all the nearby TV sets to rock and roll."
"
5E.g., Fair Lawn Industrial Park in Fair Lawn, N.Y., Readers' Digest and Inter-
national Business Machines Corp. in Westchester County, N.Y., B.F. Goodrich Co. in
Akron, Ohio and Johnson and Johnson laboratory in New Jersey.
1 CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65807 (Supp. -957), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3 75d (Supp.
1955), FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.o5-176.06 (Supp. 1956), ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24,
H9 73-78 (1955), MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, H9 4-5 (x95,), N.Y. TowN LAW § 264
(Supp. 1957), P. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39114-9 (x957). Cities of the "3d class"
in Pennsylvania and "towns" in New York appear to be the governmental subdivision
concerned with the instant problem.
"E.g., N.Y. TowN LAw § 264 (Supp. 1957). "The town board shall provide
for the manner in which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such
districts shall be determined, established ...and from time to time amended, supple-
mented or changed."
"'ILL. REV. STAT. C. 24, § 532 (1955), CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 65603 (Supp.
1957). "Every plan commission . . has the power: ... (3) To prepare and recom-
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an administrative agency to expedite the processing of an amendment by
reviewing every proposal and eliminating all but the most meritorious,
and, at the same time, relieving the town council of a time-consuming
duty. It is arguable that such a procedure tends to minimize the town
council's role by making it a rubber stamp for the planning commis-
sion, but this contention would appear to be substantially without merit,
since the planning commission is ostensibly better-qualified to consider
zoning amendments, and the town council is thereby freed to consider
other, perhaps more pressing, public matters.
The enabling acts consistently require a public hearing at which an
opportunity for a full and open discussion of the amendment must be
provided."" Moreover, the public must be notified of the time and place
of the meeting, usually by publication,'7 and the amendment must be
set forth in full in the notice.' 8 In Connecticut, the statute requires
that the amendatory regulation be filed with the town clerk for public
inspection at least ten days before public hearing.'" California adopts
still another method of notification, providing that if an area is to be
changed, the notice of the public hearing must be mailed to owners of
property on the assessment rolls whose property is located within the
area or within three hundred feet of the area in question.2 0 In some
other states, notice to interested state agencies may also be required.
mend to the corporate authorities from time to time, plans for specific improvements.. Y
ILL. REv. STAT. C. 24, § 53-2 (1955); "The planning commission or. the planning
department may prepare and submit to the legislative body ... such ... measures as
may be required to insure the execution of the master or general plan."
"'See, FLA. STAr. ANN. § 176.05 (Supp. 1956). "No such regulation, restriction,
or boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in relation thereto, at
which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard."1TSee, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39114 (1957).
18 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 375d (Supp. x955) provides "... a copy of such proposed
regulation or boundary shall be filed in the office of the town, city or borough clerk,
as the case may be, in such municipality for public inspection at least ten days before
such hearing, and may be published in full in [a news] paper [of general circulation]."
In Hutchinson v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Stratford, 138 Conn. 247,
83 A.2d 201 (1951), the published notice did not set out in full the changes to be
made but merely stated that use changes would be made within a certain district.
The ordinance was declared a nullity when the boundaries of the district were changed
without notice. See also, Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. City of
Birmingham, 253 Ala. 392, 44 So.2d 593 (1950).
"'CNN. GEN. STAT. § 37 5d (Supp. 1955). In Ribeiro v. Town of Andover, ig
Conn. Sup. 438, x16 A.2d 769 (x955), noncompliance with the statute requiring filing
the proposed amendment with the town clerk was held to render the enactment without
operative effect.
so CAL. Gor. CODE ANN. § 65805 (Supp. 1957).
19C81
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For example, Pennsylvania requires that the Department of Interior
AfFairs be notified,-1 and New York provides that notice must be given
to. the appropriate state park or parkway commission if a park or park-
way is within five hundred feet of the area subject to change.2
If, at any time before passage of the ordinance, there is. a written
protest by a substantial number of property owners in the area affected,
the statutes require a higher percentage of concurrence in the town
council for passage of the amendment than would otherwise be re-
quired. For example, the Maryland enabling act provides that if there
is a written protest by twenty per cent of the lot owners in the area to be
changed or within one hundred feet in any direction of the area, a three-
quarters vote of the town council is necessary for passage w
Finally, most states compel publication of the amendment for a
specified period in. a newspaper of general circulation after it has been
passed by the town council,24 while other states require posting in the
"market place" or on a sign board maintained by the town-clerk. 6
Some few states make no provision whatsoever for the publication of
the ordinance.
The validity of such an amendment is siubject to a variety of
challenges by the opponents of industrial inundation of residential.
zones 27  These may logically be subsumed within three general cate-
21PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 36014 (1957).
"i N.Y. TOWN LAW § z64 (Supp. 1957).
ix MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 5 (1951). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. §76.06
(Supp. 1956), providirng.for protest by landowners within 5oo feet of the area to be
changed, with MD: ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 5 (195), providing for protest by land-
owners within zoo' feet of the area to be changed. It is conceivable that allowing
protest by landowners situated as far as 500 feet from the area to be changed might
give a more representative aura to an amendment passed thereafter; however, allowing
so large an area of landowners to protest may possibly have the effect of thwarting de-
sirable amendatory enactments because of the greater possibility of an increase in the
number of votes of the town council required to pass the amendment.
" ILL. REV. STAT. C. 24, § 10-3 (1955).
25 FLA. STAT. ANN. § x65.2O (Supp. 1956).
26N.Y. TowN LAw § 2z, (Supp. 1957).
27 However, before an individual may challenge the validity. of an amendment
establishing, a special-industry district, he must show that.he has "standing" to maintain
the action. Deligtisch v. Greenburgh, 135 N.Y.S.zd 220 (1954). It has been held
that an individual has no standing unless he can show that a pecuniary loss will result.
Bowen v. Hilder, J7 N.Y.S.zd 76. (1942); Bauernschnidt v. Standard Oil Company, 153
Md. 647, 139 Atl. 531 (1927). But see, Speakman v. Mayor and Council of North
Plainfield, 8 N.J. ,250, 84 A.zd 715 (1951); Wilcox v. Pittsburgh, 121 F.21d 835 ( 3 d
Cir. 1941). See also Note, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. (1956) which concludes that 9ne must
live in close proximity to the rezoned area in order to maintain the action.
"While a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto, 'being a legislative enactment,
[VnL. 7: 88
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gories: first, that the amendment did not comply with the statutory
procedure prescribed by the state zoning enabling act;28 second, that the
amendment was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of the police power
or was not designed to promote the health, safety, or welfare of the
community, thus constituting a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment;5 and third, that the amendment resulted from an illegal dele-
gation of the legislative power of the town board to an administrative
agency ° such as a planning commission.31
A special-industry amendment which has been passed without strict
procedural compliance with the zoning enabling act or similar statute
will be held invalid, particularly when the deviation curtails the right
of the public to a hearing upon the amendment or permits inadequate
notice of the hearing to be given, 2 unless the reviewing court recog-
cannot, like a determination of a board of zoning appeals, be reviewed by certiorari
or similar procedure, its validity can nevertheless be tested in an action for a declara-
tory judgment, or in some states, in an action for injunctive relief." Zoning Bulletin,
Regional Plan ,Association, Inc., No. 59 (1951).
I YOKLEY, ZONING § 70 (1933)-
""The basis of the complaint, in either an action by an owner, the zoning of whose
property has been raised (made more restrictive), or in an action by adjacent property
owners where the zoning of an owner's property has been lowered (made less re-
strictive), would be as follows: the act of the legislative body is an improper and
arbitrary exercise of the police power in that it does not promote public health, safety,
or general welfare, [and] is discriminatory and therefore denies the equal protection of
the laws to the plaintiffs." Zoning Bulletin, Regional Plan A4ssociation, Inc., No. 56
(June x95o).
" See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 12 (195I) Which suggests that among the
various factors affecting the constitutionality of a delegation of power are these: cqack
of procedural safeguards, the grant of substantial power to a petty political officer,
absence of statutory guides or standards, and importance of the subject matter to
parties affected."
'The planning commission is an appointed body required to be established under
most state zoning enabling acts and it functions primarily as an advisory group. The
commission is usually empowered to adopt a master plan for the general development
of the community, to make reports of an advisory nature to the town council and to
initiate zoning amendments. x YOKLEY, ZONING § 114 (1953).
"The foll6wing cases were held invalid as constituting substantial deviation: Ala-
bama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. City of Birmingham, z53"Ala. 402, 44 So.2d
593 (xg5o) (ordinance was not published before passage); City of Hollywood v.
Rix, 52 So.2d x35 (Fla. 195i) (city ordinance enacted without a public hearing);
Saks & Co. v. City of Beverly Hills, 107 Cal.App:2d z6o, 237 P.2d 32 (1951) (in-
correct publication of the notice of hearing). Ribeiro v. Town of Andover, 19 Conn.
Sup. 438, t16 A.2d 769 (1955) (no publication in accordance with statute after
passage of the ordinance) ; Hutchinson v. Board of Zoning Appeals .of the Town of
Strafford, 138 Conn. 247, 83 A.2d 201 (1951) (notice did not state that zone
boundaries would be changed but did "inform the public' of a use change from residence
to light industrial district; the entire ordinance subsequently passed was a nullity).
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nizes an exception to this requirement. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit recognized such an exception in determining that the
statutory provision was merely discretionary and not mandatory."
Similarly, the validity of an amendment has been sustained, despite the
lack of strict compliance, when the statutory deviation was technical
and could produce no deleterious results.M
The challenge that a special-industry district amendment is an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of the police power involves simply a
determination of whether the amendment was reasonable under all the
circumstances, since the only inference to be drawn from an allegation of
arbitrary or capricious action in this context is that the amendment was
adopted without consideration of all the relevant factors by the town
council.35
A characterization of unreasonable or arbitrary action is to be found
in a charge of "spot zoning," which has been defined as the change of
any lot or tract of land in the midst of an established residence district
to any other less restricted district without adequate regard for location,
need, topography, access, and effect on adjacent property.86 The chal-
lenge of spot zoning, however, may be overcome by a showing that the
Sikes v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 567, 94 S.E.zd 427 (1956) (where property rights are in-'
volved the absence of a hearing is a denial of due process). See also cases collected in
Annot. 51 A.L.R.zd 263, 297.
Siinilarly vague language in defining boundaries of a district, or vagueness in any
of its terms, will make an ordinance inoperative. See Taylor v. Moore, 303 Pa. 469,
154 At. 799 (931) ' People v. Binzley, 146 Cal.App.zd 889, 303 P.zd 903 (1956).
Also, it has been held that the ordinance is invalid unless it is passed at a duly
called and constituted meeting of the town council. Turk v. Richard, 47 So.2d 543
(Fla. x95o).
"De Lano v. City of Tulsa, z6 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
654 (1928).
"' This theory has found judicial support in Louisiana and Kansas. Jonesboro v.
Gentrey, x65 La. 1003, x16 So. 48S (1928); City of Bluff City v. Western Light and
Power Corp., 137 Kan. 169, i9 P.zd 478 (1933). See also 4 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 13.08 ( 3d ed., 1949).
"s It has been argued that the reasonableness of the amendment is the sole check
upon zoning and that reasonableness is a vague term meaning anything which the
mores of society, as recognized by the courts will accept. Haar, Foreword to Zoning
in New England, 36 B.U.L. REV. 331 (x956).
"'Zoning Bulletin, Regional Plan Astociation, Inc., No. 59, March i95i. The
Regional Plan Association has defined spot zoning as "an amendment to the zoning
ordinance and map to permif additional or less restrictive uses (downward rezoning)
on one parcel of property while the surrounding neighborhood remains subject to the
previous restriction." Zoning Bulletin, Regional Plan Association, Inc., No. 56, June
1950.
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amendment was enacted in accordance with a pre-existing valid compre-
hensive or master plan 7 constituting a scheme for, the orderly develop-
ment of a town, so that maximum use may be obtained of the land area
and natural resources within the town.38 Thus, if a planning commis-
sion or similar agency recommends certain zoning changes to the town
council on the basis of a master plan and those changes are adopted, it
has uniformly been held that the ordinance is valid.n
"A "comprehensive plan" has been defined as a plan covering a wide expanse of
territory and fulfilling pressing public needs for the forseeable future. Comment,
Zoning in New England, 36 B.U.L. REV. 354, 364 (1956). It has also been sub-
mitted that the existence of a comprehensive plan may be discerned from the public
benefit resulting from zoning, i.e. the uniqueness of the area and the generality or
specificity with which the statute describes the area affected. Note, Zoning-The Non-
Conforming Use and Spot Zoning, i BUFFALO L. REV. 286 ('95z). Such analysis
of the term may lead to confusioni however, Haar has lucidly placed the whole problem
in a clearer perspective. "This general plan or comprehensive plan, with which the
amendment must conform, is many things to many courts. It may be the basic
ordinance itself... or it may be nothing more than a general feeling of fairness and
rationality." Haar, "In Accordane. With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REV.
x54 (9SS). Indeed, the cases make no attempt to define the necessary ingredients of
a comprehensive plan. Such a plan is to be distinguished, however, from a " master
plan" which is a document showing, inter alia, a survey of the present conditions of
the area, a program for the correction of undesirable conditions, an estimate of the
future growth of the town and an indication of long term goals. Haar contends
that "master plan," "comprehensive plan," "city plan," and "general plan" have no
functional distinction. See Haar, The Master Plan: .n Impermanent Constitution, 2o
LAW ANID CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (95s). However, it seems undeniable that some
distinction is apparent as well as desirable.
" See Jones v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Long Beach, 3z N.J. Super. 395,
xo8 A.zd 498 (1954), where a section of a iooo acre tract was rezoned from "Resi-
dential" to "Business." The rezoning was resisted on the grounds that the area was
primarily one of natural beauty and contained only 35 homes and that there were
ample shopping facilities accessible to all the homeowners of the area and therefore the
rezoning was unreasonable and should be declared invalid. The court upheld the
ordinance as a proper exercise of the power to zone when the council rezoned the area
to provide an accessible shopping center for the entire town. The zoning was held
to conform to the requirements of N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55-32 (1940) providing that
all zoning regulations are to be established in accordance with a comprehensive plan
and designed to: "qessen congestion in the streets; secure safety from fire, panic and
other dangers; promote health, morals or the general welfare; . . . prevent the over-
crowding of land and buildings; avoid undue concentration of population." The
statute also provided that the town legislative body consider "the character of the
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses .... " [Emphasis supplied.]
" See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 3o N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.zd 731 (x95z). In
this case, a leading spot zoning decision, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
to declare invalid an ordinance which rezoned a small parcel of a large singe-family
residential area to permit garden apartments in the rezoned area. The court held,
inter alia, that the ordinance was enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan
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Moreover, there has been a demonstrated tendency by the courts
to look behind the comprehensive plan to the economic and social utility
to be served when determining the validity of an amendment. A lead-
ing New York decision, Nappi v. LaGuardhz, 40 involved a special-
industry amendment based on the New York City zoning resolution,
which provided for the following uses in a residential area:
Landscaped administrative offices, industrial laboratory projects
and light industrial plants consistent with and designed to pro-
mote and benefit the value and use of property in residence dis-
triCts... 41
Certain residents of the- rezoned area brought an action to have the
amendment declared invalid, alleging that the industrial uses permitted
constituted spot zoning and consequently a capricious exercise of legis-
lative discretion. The court held that the amendment was not spot
zoning, as it was part of a general scheme, and stated that since Sylvania
Electric Corporation, the industry involved, intended to use the prop-
erty for a research plant, it could only be located in a restricted resi-
dential area because the character of the work to be done required
serenity and quiet. 2  Quite dearly, the court was looking behind the
and that '."spot zoning' is the very antithesis of planned zoning. If therefore an
ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan, it is not 'spot
zoning,' even though it (z) singles out and affects but one small plot.., or (z) creates
in the center of a large zone small areas-or districts devoted to a different use." Id. at
735. See also Fieldston Garden Apartments v. City of New York, 145 N.Y.S.2d 907
(N.Y. Sup. x955) (upholding as being in accordance with a comprehensive plan an
ordinance rezoning to a retailed zone a small area .located within a large residential
district) i Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. SSx, 1o5
A.d 2' 9 (1954) (upholding the rezoning of an area from Residential to Light In-
dustrial since the amendment was enacted in accordance with a comprehenive zoning
ordinance); Schmidt v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 521, 114
A.2d 902 (1955) (rezoning a section from. "Residential" to. "Industrial" was held
valid). In none of the above cases was it possible to deduce what constituted a compre-
hensive plan. In ,Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, suprs, it
was apparently held that a comprehensive zoning 9rdinance served the same purpose .s
a comprehensive plan.
do x84 Misc. 775, 54 N.YS.d- 7  (1944). Aff'd 269 App. Div. 693 (1954)i.
"New York City Zoning Resolution, art. II, § 3(io), amended. Although the
amendment allows industrial uses in a residential area, there are stringent requirements
which must be met by an industry. taking advantage of this section. First, the plant
buildings must not cover more than 25 per cent of a tract no .smaller than 1o acres.
Second, no building may exceed a height of 5o feet. Third, the architecture of the
buildings must be consistent with the surrouiding residential areas. Fourth, any part
of the tract not occupied by buildings must be landscaped as a park area and be opened
to the public.
"Nappi v. LaGuardia, 184 Misc. 775, 785, 54 N.Y.S.2d 722, 728 (1944).
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general plan to determine that the rezoning ordinance was a reasonable
exercise of municipal power.
Where a campus-industry amendment has been enacted in the ab-
sence of a comprehensive plan or pursuant to a master plan which does
not contemplate such action, a court is similarly faced with the necessity
of a factual determination of the reasonableness of an amendment which
allows industry to exist adjacent to a residential area. This was the
case in Campbell v. Borough of Hillsdale,4 3 where a one-acre lot was
rezoned from a residential area to a light industrial area to permit the
operation of a candy plant. The rezoning was declared invalid after
the court had examined all the surrounding circumstances, foremost
among which appeared to be the fact that the rezoning would benefit
only one individual.44
Since most courts will consider the over-all effect of an industrial use
upon surrounding property, a campus-industry amendment to the zoning
ordinance is quite often open to a charge of having created a nuisance,
which, if true, is the essence of capricious action. Careful draftsman-
ship and proper planning of the amendment can, however, preclude
creation of an industrial nuisance, the most obvious examples of which
are the emission of dust, noise, smoke, and odors. Rather than pro-
hibit altogether certain potentially offensive industries)4 however, "per-
formance standard" zoning has been adopted, which, by special amend-
ment, allows admission of certain types of industry complying with
specific restrictions on emission of noxious odors, noise, -and dirt.46
48 x2 N.J. Super. 1i, 79 A.2d 321 ('95i). Other cases holding an ordinance in-
valid for failure to conform to a comprehensive plan are these: N. T. Hegeman Co.
v. Mayor and Council of Borough of River Edge, 6 N.J. Super. 495, 6o A.2d 767
(x949) (ordinance establishing set back lines held invalid) ; Cassel v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.zd 486 (1950) (creation of commercial
district in residential area held invalid), Speakinan v. Mayor and Council of North
Plaiifleld, 8 N.J. 25o, 84 A.zd 715 (.951) (creation of Modified Commercial Zone
in a preexisting Residential Zone held invalid).
"This amendment was invalidated notwithstanding a referendum of the 1300 resi-
dents of the community of which 1xoo had voted in favor of the amendment. It
seems, then, that a judicial determination that the amendment was not enacted in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan obviates the announced desires of a majority of the
community.
45 This rigid method is applied in the BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF THE ToWN
OF RAMAPO, NEw YORK, p. 14-.5 (amended i953), whih lists 5z specific types of
'industrial operations from acetylene gas ianufactuiing to yeast manufacfuring which
are excluded. The ordinance then provides for the exclusion of "any other trade or
use that is noxious or offensive by reason of the emission of odor, dust, imoke, gas or
noise?.'
" For example, the BUILDING ZONE w ORDINANCE OF THE TowN OJF YoRTcwN,
_01S
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Usually, such an ordinance prohibits those industries which emit
offensive amounts of noise and substances discernable at the property
line. Fulton County, Georgia, for example, provides that noise sup-
pression devices must be used where noise resulting from normal
operations may be heard more than one hundred-fifty feet beyond the
property lines.47
Another condition quite often considered a nuisance is industry's
capacity to generate heavy traffic, which must be excluded from resi-
dential areas if optimal living standards are to be maintained. 4  That
such a result is capable of attainment has been demonstrated at the
Johnson and Johnson laboratory in Newark, New Jersey, and at the
B. F. Goodrich laboratory in Akron, Ohio,49 where elimination of traffic
congestion in the residential area was achieved by requirements of
off-street parking facilities and a schedule limitation to certain hours
for truck transportation. Similarly, selective zoning of areas for special
industry districts accessible to major existing roads would alleviate
traffic generation in the residential area. 4'1 In Parson v. Tcon of
N.Y. § S (amended 1957) provides for the establishment of a Planned Light Industry
District. This ordinance enumerates not the prohibited uses but those uses permitted.
In addition it provides that other industry will be acceptable if it can comply with.
fixed standards regarding 'offensive emissions. Performance standard zoning is com-
mented upon generally by Polk, Performance Zoning for Industry, 38 PUBLIC MANACE-
MENT ' 79, x956, where it is defined as fixed, objective criteria designed to limit the
affect of an industrial operation upon adjacent uses and upon the entire community.
Municipal Administration, Associated Institutes of Government of Pennsylvania Uni-
versities (Dec. 1952), suggests that performance zoning, although a new concept, is
ripe for greater application due to technological advances which have provided noise
deadening techniques and installations preventing the emission of recognizable offensive
amounts of smoke odors. The present application of performance zoning is also urged
by one of the outstanding community planning consulting firms, Frederick P. Clark
& Associates. See Memorandum, Revised Draft of Proposed Planned Light Industrial
District Regulations by M. S. Emanuel of Frederick P. Clark & Associates dated June
22, 1957, on file in Duke Law Library.
"'Site Regulations for Fulton Industrial District, Fulton Co., Georgia (undated)
on file in the Duke Law Library. See also, letter from Mr. Harold Sheats, County At-
torney, Fulton Co., Georgia, to the DUKE LAW JouRNM., March 8, x958 which states
that the general zoning "law of Fulton County . . . prohibits 'in general those uses
which may be obnoxious or offensive by reason of emission of odor, dust, smoke, gas
or noise or vibration.' Art. XVI, Sec. 2, Par. 33."
" Fonoroff, The Relationship of Zoning to Traffic-Generators, 20 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROB. 238 (x955). The article contains an exhaustive discussion of the impact
of vehicular traffic on various use districts, especially residential areas.
"Fonoroff, op. cit. supra at 245.
'o Fonoroff, op. cit. supra at 243. The article supports the requirements for off-
street parking because it would tend to remove obstacles to traffic activity. In addi-
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Wethersfwld,5 the court considered the proximity to a major highway
of the rezoned land to be an "important factor" in sustaining the amend-
ment. Furthermore, a Massachusetts court upheld an amendment
when it was apparent that the city council had made the best possible
use of land along a main highway when the district was rezoned from
a residential area to one for special industry.5
A further objection to special-industry zoning arises from a fear that
industrial neighbors will depreciate residential property values, and as
a result, the amendment is challenged as being arbitrary and capricious.
That such an argument is regarded as being without merit is illustrated
by the case of Robinson v. City of Los Angeles,53 where the city had
rezoned 785 acres of vacant land from an agricultural zone to a light in-
dustry area. The court stated that the ordinance was not invalid even
though homes situated as far as a quarter of a mile away would de-
predate in value, since damage caused by the proper exercise of the
police power is "merely one of the prices an individual must pay as a
member of society." 54 Practically, however, it seems dear that sur-
rounding residential land need not depredate if proper restrictions are
placed upon the industrial use. 5
Aside from assertions that it constitutes an improper exercise of the
police power, however, an amendment for special industry may be
challenged on the ground that such action is beyond the scope of local
lion, however, in a residential area it seems possible that a prime factor influencing such
requirement would be to assure an atmosphere of serenity and quiet.
61 135 Conn. 24, 6o A.zd 771 (-948).
"'Shannon v. Building Inspector of Woburn, 378 Mass. 633, 636, xo5 N.E.2d 192,
194 (1952), wherein the court states: "The areas zoned for residential and manu-
facturing uses before the amendment were not of a character to attract large modern
manufacturing plants. The city council could reasonably conclude that rezoning the
areas adjacent to the new circumferential highway for manufacturing and business pur-
poses would attract to Woburn desirable manufacturing and business establishments
which otherwise would not locate there .... "
5a 146 Cal.App.2d '8o, 304 P.zd 814 (1956). See also, other cases in which
confiscation had been alleged and in which it was held there had been valid exercise
of legislative power. Williams v. Village of Schiller Park, 9 Ill.2d 596, 138 N.E.zd
5oo (1956) (depreciation of nearby property) i Rams-Head Co. v. City of Des Plains,
9 Ill.zd 326, 137 N.E.2d 500 (x956) ($32,000 market loss) i Pondfield Road Com-
pany v. Village of Bronxville, x A.D.zd 897, i5o N.Y.S.2d 91o (1956) (limitation of
usable floor area)..
"'Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 53 at 8x6. Also the opinion of one
text is that although the police power is subject to various limitations its use in zoning
is not limited by mere financial loss. I YoKLEY, ZONING § 35 (1953).
"'See material from the files of the Regional Plan Ass'n., Inc., N.Y., on file in
the Duke Law Library which points out that planned light industry districts exist in
19s81
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legislative authority-that the amendment has no relation to the public
health, safety, or welfare. Thus, it has been held that zoning based
upon aesthetic or financial considerations is not encompassed within the
police power 6 and is, therefore, void.57 The Supreme Court of the
United States, however, in Berman v. Parker,"8 announced that the "tra-
ditional applications" of the police power-public safety, health, and
welfare-are not limitations upon its valid exercise, but are rather
illustrations of a broader power which might properly include "aesthetic
areas surrounded by $4oooo-$5o,ooO homes. An example would be Fair Lawn In-
dustrial Park in Fair Lawn, N.J.
" The rule that zoning based an aesthetics is invalid is illustrated by City of West
Palm Beach v. State, z58 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 491 (1947) where the city attempted to
require that every new building should substantially equal the adjacent. building in
appearance. The ordinance was held to be void as having no relation to the health,
safety or morals of the public. For the view that economic considerations are not a
proper basis for zoning see Ingersoll v. Village of South Orange, 3 N.J. Misc. 3;5, 1z8
Adt. 393 (Sup. Ct. 1925) where the city prohibited apartment houses in any zone
because the city could not afford proper fire fighting equipment.
For many years writers have urged the courts to extricate themselves from existing
confusion over the role of aesthetics in community land programs. See Dukeminier,
Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 2o LAW AND CONTMIsP. PROn. 218
(x955) where it is suggested that in some instances zoning for aesthetic purposes is
valid and when that is the case the courts should broaden the definition of the proper
exercise of the police power to include aesthetics rather than twisting each case to fit
within the traditional spheres of proper exercise of the police power such as health,
safety or morals. But see Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote
the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 0949), which postulates that property valui
protection is a valid exercise of the police power5 that aesthetic zoning protects prop-
erty values, thus aesthetic zoning is valid.
"The following cases have declared ordinances invalid as zoning for aesthetic
purposes: Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 18 F.zd 593 (932)
(zoning old ladies home out of residential area); Hitchman v. Oakland Township',
329 Mich. 33", 45 N.W.2d 3o6 (195i) (imposition of minimum floor area for houses
held invalid); Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d
499 (.95x), (changing half block from apartment to residential use under the circum-
stances invalid).
"in zoning cases [as ihese] no matter what the real problems are, it is generally
argued that the regulations under attack were really concerned with the public health
and safety. Moreover, it is customary also to invoke 'the general welfare' in a way
which seems to assume that this is something definite and meaningful, and also some-
thing quite different from health and safety. It is rare that the particular problems
affecting health, safety or other aspects of welfare are spelled out, analyzed, and evalu-
ated. There is then no reason to be surprised that the resulting court opinions tend
to proceed on a remarkably low intellectual level." Williams, Planning Law and
Democratic Living, 2o LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 318 (1955).
" 348 U.S. 26 (1954). This case involved the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945, the purpose of which was to employ the government's power of eminent
domain to clear slum areas of "blighted" housing. The plaintiff objected to the de-
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and spiritual values." Consequently, when faced with a requirement
that buildings and grounds conform to a standard compatible with the
surrounding residential area, industry will have little success in press-
ing the argument that aesthetic zoning is ultra vires. Such a require-
ment could have the effect of lessening the impact of industry upon
adjacent property, by providing for !'buffer zones" of wooded or
shrubbed areas to be established between the industry site and adjacent
residential propertye9 and that the plant buildings substantially harmo-
nize with the predominant architectural style of the area.60 Similarly,
a requirement that buildings should be set back from the property line
and limited to an area of a designated percentage of the site would
further the desired result, as would restrictions which limit the height
of the buildings to some specific standard.,-
Financial considerations were originally held improper criteria upon
which to base a special-industry zoning amendment,62 but this rule
seems recently to have been somewhat relaxed in line with the more
liberal approach to rezoning- for industry. Illustrative is Seiber v.
struction of his property, a department store, which he contended was not blighted
housing, and thus the destruction would be violative of due process as thetaking of his
property was not for the purpose of advancing the public health, safety or morals.
The court held the act valid, and it said that "public safety, health, morality, peace and
quiet, law and order ... merely illustrate the scope of the police power and do not
delimit it." 348 U.S. 26, 32. Some writers have heralded this statement as the
Supreme Court's recognition- of the validity of zoning for aesthetic purposes. Comment,
39 MJltQ. L. REv. 135 (x955); Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Plan-
ning, 20 LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 199, 207 (1955); Rodda, The 4ccomplishment
of 4esthetic Purposes .Under the Police Power, 27 So. CALir. L. R-. 149 (1954);
Regional Plan Association Inc. Bulletin 86, Zoning A1dvances in the New Jersey-New
York-Connecticut Metropolitan Area.
" See Memorandum, .Frederick P. Clark & Associates, Planned Light Industry Zones,
June 27, 1957, wherein the use of buffer zones is urged when industrial property is
adjacent to residential areas.
iolbid
1 Rhode Island Development Council, Local Planning Bulletin 9, March 15, 1957,
which urges that "when a new industrial use comes into being, protection can -and
should be provided for nearby residential property... The principal provisions which
have been used for some time in better zoning texts [include] the following: (a) a
.requirement that yards be provided and building .heights limited on industrial property
adjacent to residential areas; (b) for industrial uses that tend to be unsightly, such
as the outdoor storage of materials, there ihould be provision for fencing or natural
screening between the industrial use-and the residential area."
"See Ingersoll v. Village of South Orange, 3 N.J. Misc. 335, z28 AtL. 393 (Sup.
Ct. 1925) discussed at note 56 supra; Springfield Township v. Bensley, x9 NJ. Super.
147, 88 A.2d 271 (Ch. 1952) wherein it was held that the court would not consider
the financial evidence advanced and thereby uphold a zoning ordinance which otherwise
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Laawe,6 3 where the court upheld the validity of an amendment per-
mitting "qaboratory projects" to enter previously residential areas,
noting that since the town had exceeded its legal borrowing power, addi-
tional revenue provided by laboratory projects would provide a solu-
tion to the current revenue problem. Thus, in the light of the general
tax benefits accruing to the township, the rezoning of a residential area
was valid. Similarly, in the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, a
special "floating zone" 64 was created, which could later be located in a
particular area when the need for an industrial zone arose. The ordi-
nance was based ostensibly upon the need to supplement current income
with nonresidential tax ratables to defray the cost of necessary municipal
services. In determining the validity of this ordinance, the court in
Newark Milk Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills,65 posed the following
question and answer:
Is a zoning classification based upon such a purpose and intent
a valid exercise of the police power? I think it is. Zoning...
may be invoked to serve the public health, morals and well-
being.6
Thus, it is apparent that the validity of financial considerations in
prompting a special industry amendment to the local zoning ordinance
has gained judicial recognition.
had no relation to the public health, safety or morals. But see, Smith, Municipal
Economy and Land Use Restrictions, 2o LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 481 (1955) where-
in it is argued that the consideration of a municipality's financial burden does have
a place in the development of a comprehensive zoning ordinance or amendment.
Cf. Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an Instrument for Community
Planning, 57 YALE L.J. 2i9 (1947).
es 3 3 N.J. Super. x5s, xxS, io9 A.zd 470, 472 (x954). Pertinent portions of the
amendatory ordinance are, "x. In a Residence 'A' or Residence '13 District, ... [the
following uses are permitted:] -. . . also, landscaped administrative offices, laboratories
devoted to research, design and/or experimentation and processing and fabrication in-
cidental thereto and appurtenant buildings consistent with and designed to promote and
benefit the value and use of property in residence districts or in areas which are pre-
dominantly residential although partly lying in less restricted districts .... "
" The floating zone is a district created in an ordinance but mapped in no particular
spot. The ordinance provides all the standards and uses for the district which may be
held in abeyance until the planning commission or town council decides that the zone
should be applied to a particular tract of land. This type zoning has, apparently, not
yet been tested in the courts. Regional Plan Association, Inc., Bulletin No. 86, Zoning
ldvances in the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut Metropolitan Area, p. 12, May
1956.





Finally, although the special-industry amendment as a whole may
achieve judicial approbation, a particular section may be invalidated
as an improper delegation of discretion to an administrative agency in
supervising industrial site development. This point was raised in
Newark Milk Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills,67 where the town council
delegated to the planning commission the power to pass upon the
appropriateness and design of the site plan in relation to the character
of the neighborhood. The court held that such control by the planning
commission would be interference with private land use for no valid
purpose, and, moreover, that the planning commission could pass only
upon such matters which were of a public interest, thus emasculating a
provision essential for effective control of the industrial site use in the
rezoned area. It is unfortunate that courts continue to accede to the
delegation shibboleth, particularly when administrative co-ordination
of industrial zoning with existing residential uses is essential in achieving
the most beneficial and harmonious results.
An ordinance provision which delegates power to the planning
commission to approve site plans is a fairly common phenomenon"
and should not incur adverse judicial criticism if an adequate set of
standards or a statement of policy is provided whereby the commission
may determine whether or not the site plan is harmonious with the
surrounding residential area.'* In one special-industry ordinance, the
criteria adduced for the benefit of the commission in determining
whether the site blends properly with the surrounding area include
the location of the buildings on the property, the uses to be established
MId. at 27.
"See American Society of Planning Officials, Architectural Control-A Collection
of References to, and Summaries of, Articles Dealing swith Architectural Control;
Excerpts from Zoning Ordinances (undated). An example of such delegated power
is contained in the Pasco, Washington ordinance which provides that telephone ex-
changes and similar public utility uses may exist in a residential area by special permit
of the planning commission provided that such buildings conform to and harmonize
with the surrounding buildings as to architecture, setback and landscaping.
"Cf. DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17 (95 1) wherein it is noted that many
state courts are quite lenient toward sweeping delegation when such grants achieve
socially desirable ends and some courts have even gone so far as to imply standards
which, in fact, were not stated in the legislation. Perhaps the following delegatory
provision may be regarded as providing the proper standards: ". . . The Planning
Board shall consider the location of such business, industrial and office buildings and
related uses with respect to the topography of the lot, with the objective of securing a
maximum harmony of such buildings and uses with the surrounding landscape and




in connection with the topography of the lot, the use of buffer strips, and
the height and architecture of the buildings.70  By including these cri-
teria, the ordinance appears to establish sufficient minimum standards
to protect neighboring property from most potential "sight nuisances."
An even more workable ordinance is that of the City of Santa Barbara,
California, which provides that the planning commission may pass upon
site plans showing the "proposed landscape or treatment of the grounds
around the buildings ... in keeping with the character of the neighbor-
hood."71
The problem of delegation of legislative, power is frequently en-
countered when the ordinance grants an agency the power to declare
a "variance.1172  In this situation, it has been held that the delegation
is valid if accompanied by a standard sufficiently precise to guide the
agency in its determination.7 By analogy, it would seem that delega-
tion of power to the planning commission should be subject to no greater
limitation.
CONCLUSION
Admission of a carefully-selected and well-planned light industry
to residential communities will undoubtedly, in many instances, prove
mutually beneficial. -irtually without exception, industry would enjoy
lower tax -rates, better working conditions for its employees, lower
operating costs, and the aesthetic values and benefits inherent in the
serenity and quiet of a residential background. Concomitantly, the
municipality would benefit from an enlarged tax base, an increase in the
volume of local business, a possible solution of local unemployment
problems 74 and a diversification of social strata which would arguably
lead to the development of an indigenous cultural characteristic.
OBULD'iN ZONE ORDINANCE, TOWN OF YORKTOWN, N.Y., § 5AI '(1941)
(amended 1957).
71 BUILDING ZONE ORDINANcE No. 47, SAN PABLO, CALIF., § 4.6 (1950).
"A variance is a special form of relief granting to the landowner permission not
to use his land in conformity with the ordinance when compliance would result in un-
necessary hardship. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 32-16, 17 (1957). The facts which
must exist before a variance is granted are: "(x) the land in question cannot yield a
reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight
of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood .. . ; and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not
alter the essential character of the locality' Otto ,v. Steinhilber, 28z N.Y. 71, 76, 24
N.E.2d 851, 853 (x939)-
7 Aloe v. Dassler, 278 App. Div. 975, xo6 N.Y.S.2d 24 (95); Crossroads Realty,
Inc. v. Gilbert, 1o9 N.Y.S.zd 59 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
"Letter from Frederick P. Clark, community planning and development con-
sultant, to the DUKE LAW JOURNAL, NOV. 4, 1957, on file in the Duke Law Library.
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